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ON PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL IGNORES THE PRIOR OPINION 
OF THIS COURT WHICH STATED THAT THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE INADEQUATE . . . . 1 
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THE NEW ISSUES RAISED IN DOMS' REPLY SHOULD 
EITHER NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OR 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST DOMS 8 
A. Doms has violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure by raising issues 
for the first time in his reply brief. 8 
B. Even if the court chooses to address the claims made for the first time in 
Doms' reply brief, those claims are without merit and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs/AppeUees/cross-appellants, Ellen Anderson, etal. (hereinafter "Anderson" 
or "Plaintiffs") submit this brief in reply to the "Reply Brief and Response on Cross-Appeal 
of Defendant/Appellant and Cross-Appellee" submitted by Defendant Doms (hereinafter 
"Doms5 Reply Brief). However, this brief contains additional material in response to issues 
raised for the first time in Doms' Reply Brief. Doms raised new issues in violation of Rule 
24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This brief first addresses Doms' response 
to the issues raised on the cross-appeal by Anderson and then responds to the new issues 
raised for the first time in Doms' Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DOMS' ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE POINTS RAISED 
ON PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL IGNORES THE PRIOR OPINION 
OF THIS COURT WHICH STATED THAT THE FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE INADEQUATE. 
On the cross-appeal, Anderson raised the following points: 
1. Doms was not entitled to damages because he did not own the entire property. 
2. Doms' election of rescission precluded a subsequent trial on damages. 
3. The trial court deprived plaintiffs Anderson and Scott of benefits to which they were 
entitled under the trust deed note. 
4. The trial court improperly offset Doms5 damages against those owed to plaintiffs. 
1 
5. The court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations did not bar Doms' 
counterclaim. 
Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 1-2, 38-49. 
Doms does not directly address the arguments raised by Anderson, rather Doms 
claims that the issues should be "summarily dismissed." Doms' claim is based on bits and 
pieces of trial transcripts and the trial court's orders and memorandum decisions. However, 
Doms' claim ignores statements by this Court. 
In its memorandum opinion in this case, this Court found several issues raised by 
Plaintiffs "to be without merit." Anderson v. Doms, Case No. 920653CA Slip Op. 2 (Utah 
Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1994). However, the court also noted: 
Because it is possible that the trial court will order the contract 
rescinded due to the lack of evidence in the record concerning prejudice, we 
need not address the other claims raised. However, in the event the trial court 
does not rescind the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings and 
conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the intervening conveyances 
to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to pursue his counterclaim and the effect 
of the default judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of 
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property 
and any damages for breach of title warranties. 
Anderson. Slip op. at 3 n.2 (emphasis added). It was in response to this statement by this 
Court that Plaintiffs raised all but one of the issues presented in the cross-appeal.1 
Therefore, Doms' argument ignores this Court's determination that the trial court's findings 
and conclusions on these issues were inadequate. Yet, Doms persists in pressing the 
inadequate findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
lrThe last issue presented by Anderson, concerning the proper application of the 
statute of limitations, was not mentioned by this Court in the note. 
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At the same time Doms raises these claims, he also ignores those parts of Anderson's 
brief on each issue which demonstrates the inadequacy of those findings and conclusions. 
For example, in response to Anderson's assertion that Doms is not entitled to an award of 
damages as he owned only a one-half interest in the property, Doms cites only portions of 
the trial court's findings/conclusions which he claims support the notion that Doms did own 
the entire property. The trial court found on remand that the Sheriffs sale transferred the 
interests of McCoy to Plaintiffs. (Order on Court's Minute Entry, at 4) However, the court 
also found that McCoy had no ownership interest at the time the sheriffs deed was issued. 
Id. Based on its findings, the trial concluded that: 
The default Judgment entered against McCoy and the sheriffs sale of 
McCoy's interest in Rossi Hills has no effect on Doms's ownership interest in 
the property and his ability to collect damages for breach of title warranties, 
because McCoy had no ownership interest in Rossi Hills when the sheriffs 
sale pursuant to the default judgment against McCoy was conducted; and 
plaintiffs, therefore, acquired no ownership interest in the property from the 
sheriffs sale. 
(Order on Court's Minute Entry at 5). This conclusion of law is contrary to the court's 
Supplemental Findings and Conclusions which Doms ignores. There, the court stated, "The 
undivided interest of Michael McCoy was sold at Sheriffs Sale so that only fifty percent 
(50%) of the property could be tendered for rescission." The conclusion should be corrected 
for the reasons set out in Anderson's opening brief. 
Those reasons include the fact that the trustee held the title of both Doms and McCoy. 
The title of the Trustee may only be acquired by: (a) a release of the Trustee's ownership, 
which is accomplished by the trustee's Deed of Reconveyance or (b) foreclosure of the 
Trustee's interest by either following the procedure authorized for Trustee foreclosure, or 
3 
by foreclosing the interest as a mortgage, which is authorized by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-34. 
The beneficiaries of this Trust Deed, Anderson and Scott, elected to foreclose by proceeding 
under the provisions authorizing the foreclosure of the Trust Deed in the manner provided 
for foreclosure of a mortgage. 
A special execution was issued, and the Sheriff conducted a sale. Subsequent to the 
sale, and after expiration of the redemption period, a Sheriffs Deed was issued conveying 
McCoy's undivided one-half interest in the property to Plaintiffs, the high bidders at the sale. 
No redemption was made. Doms' undivided one-half interest remained in the Trustee, but 
Doms had transferred and conveyed such encumbered interest to Domcoy which was then 
the equitable owner Doms' interest. Further, Doms in court reviewed the Sheriff s Deed and 
insisted on a correction to indicate the deed only affected McCoy's interest. 
The sale and transfer by Doms and McCoy to Domcoy exhausted their right to claim 
damages against Plaintiffs. The covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant and 
does not run with the land. See. ££., Beeslev v. Badger. 240 P. 458 (Utah 1925) (the 
covenant against encumbrance was a personal covenant, "not running with the land." ). 
In order to properly assess damages, there would have to be evidence of damages that 
existed on the date of the sale to Domcoy, as this is the time when Doms would have 
incurred damages resulting from the loss of value by reason of the encumbrances, not at any 
subsequent time, as the measure of damages would be the loss incurred at the time of the 
transfer. Doms was entitled only to one-half of the damages, if any, that are properly proven 
since he was only a one-half owner. In the event of a sale of the property, he would have 
been entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds and no more. 
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Subsequent transfers between or among Doms and Domcoy could only affect the one-
half interest held by Mr. Doms which was subject to the trust deed. The transfer by Doms 
of his interest in the real estate could only involve his interest subject to the Trust Deed. A 
grantor cannot grant an estate larger than that which is vested in him. As a result, all 
transfers to or among Doms and Domcoy are subject to this limitation. The portion of the 
judgment that purports to quiet title without regard to the trust deed is without supporting 
evidence. 
If the tax sale deed to Summit County was valid, it would have eliminated right or title 
of the trustee and Domcoy. Fortunately, the tax sale was not conducted properly and 
Plaintiffs, in order to protect their interest, the interest of the Trustee and the interest of 
Domcoy instituted action against Summit County which resulted in a judgment to the effect 
that the tax sale was invalid and that Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of one-half 
interest, subject to the Trust Deed. (R. 6896, 7069). 
With respect to Point V of Anderson's brief which argues that Doms was precluded 
from a trial on damages because he had unsuccessfully elected to pursue the remedy of 
rescission, Doms claims that "a party has not been required to 'elect remedies'.. . since at 
least the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on January 1, 1950." Doms' Reply 
Brief at 16. In support of this fallacious claim, Doms cites Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 
(Utah 1962). In fact, Doms' reliance on Smoot is misplaced. Later cases clearly explain that 
Smoot merely stands for the proposition that a party may plead inconsistent theories of 
recovery but that recovery may be had on only one theory. See, e.g.. Cook Associates. Inc. 
v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1983); Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery 
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Center, Inc.. 613 P.2d510, 511 (Utah 1980). 
The doctrine of election of remedies is clearly recognized by both the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court. One of the best articulations of the doctrine is found in Royal 
Resources. Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979). There, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of 
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any 
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said 
doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, 
a knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of fraud or 
imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a 
purpose to forego all others. 
603 P.2d at 796 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). See also Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank 671 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983); Palmer v. Haves. 892 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 
(Utah Ct App. 1995); Langston v. McOuarrie. 741 P.2d 554, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Indeed, the resolution of Royal Resources clearly indicates the applicability of the doctrine 
of election of remedies in this case. In Royal Resources the Utah Supreme Court held the 
doctrine was not applicable because the defendant did not properly raise the doctrine and, 
thus, waived it. Roval Resources. 603 P.2d at 796. Here, the Plaintiffs properly invoked the 
doctrine but the trial court permitted Doms to pursue two inconsistent remedies. The 
importance of requiring an election in a case involving rescission is particularly acute. In 
such an action the party claiming rescission has the choice of repudiating the contract or 
affirming the contract and seeking damages pursuant to it. But, according to Roval 
Resources, once the choice is made other remedies are excluded. Here, Doms was permitted 
to repudiate the contract but then, after losing the rescission case, he sought to enforce those 
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provisions of the contract which were advantageous to him. A party must either repudiate 
the whole contract and seek rescission or enforce the whole contract and seek damages. To 
allow a party to both repudiate a contract and seek to enforce parts of it illustrates the basic 
reason which supports the doctrine of election of remedies. See, e.g.. Barrington 
Management Co. v. Draper Family Ltd. Partnership, 695 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998) ("The party rescinding the contract must repudiate the part of the contract which is 
beneficial to him as well as that part of the contract which is not He may not affirm that 
part of the contract which pleases him and rescind that part which he considers 
disadvantageous.") Here, Doms was wrongly permitted to repudiate the contract and yet 
pursue damages under the contract., when he was unable to satisfy all of the elements 
necessary for rescission. 
With respect to the issues raised in Points VI and VII of the cross-appeal, that 
Anderson and Scott are entitled to the benefit of the contract and that setoff was not available 
to Doms, Doms does not dispute these issues but merely dismisses them as "not applicable." 
However, Doms does nothing to demonstrate why these assertions by the Plaintiffs are not 
applicable. 
Finally, with regard to Plaintiffs Point VHI, in which Plaintiffs assert that the statute 
of limitations barred all claims by Doms, Doms states that this Court disposed of the issue 
in its prior opinion. Even if that is so, an appellate court may reopen an issue when it 
believes that the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 1995). That is what happened 
with this issue in this case. The facts clearly illustrate that the limitations had expired before 
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Doms filed any answer and counterclaim in this case. An exhibit was presented to the trial 
court and appended as Addendum 14 to Anderson's original brief, which plainly illustrates 
the fact that the statute of limitations barred Doms' claims. Additionally, Doms claims to 
have tendered or demanded rescission on many occasions, the record he cites does not 
support this statement. All reference pages are attached as Addenda 1. Further, Doms did 
not at any of the indicated times have ownership of the property because he conveyed it to 
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on August 30,1983 [Exhibit 16]. Doms did not obtain any equity 
in the property until August 28, 1988, some five years later, when he gave himself a deed 
from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. [Exhibit 10]. 
Because Doms refuses to acknowledge all of the prior decision of this Court and does 
not adequately address the issues raised by Plaintiffs in the cross-appeal, those issues must 
be decided in Plaintiffs' favor. 
POINT H 
THE NEW ISSUES RAISED IN DOMS' REPLY SHOULD 
EITHER NOT BE ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OR 
SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST DOMS. 
The last several pages of Doms' Reply Brief are consumed by issues which are raised 
for the first time. Doms Reply Brief at 18-25. Those issues should not be addressed by this 
Court. If the court chooses to review the issues, they should be decided against Doms. 
A. Doms has violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure by raising issues for the first time 
in his reply brief 
For the first time in this appeal Doms claims in his reply brief that the trial court 
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erred when it ruled that the warranty deed, trust deed and trust deed note do not constitute 
a single contract; that plaintiffs were in breach; and that Doms was not in default. Neither 
Doms' docketing statement nor his opening brief in this appeal alludes to this issue, much 
less identifies it as an issue for resolution on appeal.2 
In raising this issue, Doms has blatantly violated the Rules of Appellate Procedure as 
interpreted by the courts of this state. Rule 24(c) clearly limits the contents of a reply brief 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have long interpreted Rule 24(c) to mean that an 
issue raised for the first time in a reply brief will not be considered. See State v. Brown. 853 
P.2d 851, 854 n. 1 (Utah 1992); Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162,1169 n.6 (Utah 1988); 
Ottesonv. State. 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Broadbent v. Board of Education 
of Cache County. 910 P.2d 1274,1277 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This Court should simply 
refuse to address the claims of error made by Doms for the first time in his reply brief. 
One of the advantages Doms realizes by raising issues for the first time in his reply 
brief is that this allows him to bypass the requirements of Rule 24(a)(5). This rule requires 
that the proponent of a claim clearly cite the portion of the record wherein the issue was 
2This is not the only instance in which Doms demonstrates a disregard for the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Indeed, Doms' brief violates the typeface requirements of 
Rule 27(b). That rule requires that briefs prepared using a proportional typeface use a 
typeface no smaller than 13 point. This brief and Anderson's opening brief use a 13-
point typeface. Comparison of the two briefs filed by Doms to this brief clearly illustrate 
the smaller typeface used by Doms (simply compare the number of lines per page). By 
using the smaller typeface, Doms has been inadvertently permitted to file over length 
briefs. This is particularly egregious in light of the fact that Plaintiffs sought, but were 
refused, permission to file an over length brief in the typeface required by the appellate 
rules. It is ironic that presumably part of the reason for the court's denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion for an over length brief was Doms opposition to the motion. 
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preserved for appeal and cite authorities which set out the standard of appellate review. In 
his reply brief, Doms has met neither of these requirements. Nowhere in the brief does 
Doms specifically state where this issue was preserved for appellate review. Indeed, in only 
one new issue out four contained in his reply brief does Doms even attempt, albeit without 
citation to authorities, to identify the appropriate standard of appellate review. 
In instances in which a party on appeal has failed to adhere to the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the appellate courts have presumed the correctness of the record and/or the 
judgment. For example, in Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
the appellant had, among other things, completely ignored the standard of review 
requirement imposed by Rule 24(a)(5). Stating that the requirement promoted accuracy and 
efficiency, this Court held that the requirement could not be ignored and, based on the 
appellant's lack of compliance with the rules, assumed the correctness of the trial court's 
judgment. Id, As in Christensert Doms, by raising issues for the first time in his reply brief, 
has ignored the requirements of Rule 24(a)(5). As it did in Christensen, this Court should 
reject the issues raised by Doms and assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment on 
these issues. See also Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 1108,1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Koulis 
v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
B. Even if the court chooses to address the claims made for the first time in Doms' reply 
brief those claims are without merit and should be rejected by this Court. 
1. Doms has not marshaled the evidence to support his new claims. 
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In the new claims presented in Doms' reply brief, Point IV A through D, Doms claims 
that the trial court erred in entering a variety of rulings with respect to the question of 
whether the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note constitute a single contract 
whether Doms was excused from performance and not in default under the documents. 
Doms' Reply Brief at 18-24. In each instance, Doms challenges a ruling by the trial court. 
In one instance out of four contained in his reply brief, Doms asserts that the rulings were 
only conclusions and therefore, should be shown no deference on appeal. Doms' Reply 
Brief at 22. In the other instances, the source of the disputed rulings is unclear. Indeed, in 
at least one instance, Doms fails to identify the source of one of the disputed rulings as the 
trial court's findings of fact. Specifically, in Point IV C, Doms claims that the trial court 
erred when it found that he was in default. However, Doms fails to inform the court that the 
trial court found in its Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Doms was 
in default. The trial court found: 
1 0 . . . . 
h. Doms was in default; therefore, could not invoke the doctrine 
of rescission. 
13. The trust deed required the defendants and each of them to pay the 
accruing taxes on the Property and the defendants failed to pay the taxes for 
the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. 
14. The defendants and each of them were in substantial default under the 
provisions of the Trust Deed as they failed to pay the required real estate taxes 
which resulted in the sale of the Property to Summit County on May 27,1987. 
18. The defendants and each of them were in default as the payments required 
by the Promissory Note to be made after September, 1984, were not paid, nor 
were the taxes paid. 
(Addendum 10 to Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants). 
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For the most part, Doms1 new claims concerning the trial court's rulings on the unity 
of the documents and whether Doms was in default are attacks on the sufficiency of the 
findings of the trial court. However, the findings set forth above and others which have not 
been set out here which form the basis for the trial court's conclusions are not even 
mentioned in Domsf brief. Doms1 failure to confront these critical findings means that he has 
also not demonstrated them to be clearly erroneous by marshaling the evidence which 
support them and showing that the evidence is insufficient. 
This Court has stated that failure of an appellant to marshal the supporting evidence 
or presentation of merely contradictory evidence is an adequate basis for affirming the trial 
court. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). On 
that basis, this Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on the unity of the documents and 
Doms' default. 
The findings set forth by the court in its Supplemental Findings and Conclusions are 
sufficient. This Court has previously stated that if findings are so inadequate that they 
cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations, the appellant is relieved of his 
duty to marshal the evidence in an attack on the findings. Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 
474,477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court however then stated that findings in that case were 
inadequate because they provided "no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
decision and render appellate review unfeasible." Woodward. 823 P.2d at 478. Despite 
Doms? claims, the findings provide insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
decision and render effective review possible. 
In short, Doms* failure to marshal the evidence to support his attack on the findings 
12 
should, in and of itself, be a sufficient basis for this Court to affirm the plaintiffs position 
on the new issues raised in Doms' reply brief. 
2. The warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note constituted separate contracts. 
Even if this Court overlooks the numerous procedural deficiencies in the new issues 
raised in Doms' reply brief, Doms should not prevail. Doms contends that the trial court 
erroneously ruled that the warranty deed, trust deed, and trust deed note did not constitute 
a single contract or transaction. Furthermore, Doms complains that this led to the court's 
ruling that Doms was not excused from performance under the trust deed and trust deed note 
because of his default under those instruments. In addition, Doms asserts that (1) Plaintiffs 
breached the warranty deed when they conveyed Rossi Hills with the encumbrances and title 
defects; (2) Doms was subsequently excused from performance regarding the entire 
transaction because of the Plaintiffs' breach of the covenant in the warranty deed and, (3) 
therefore, Doms was not in default under the trust deed and trust deed note. Doms1 claims 
on these issues ignore findings of fact made by the trial court and case law and therefore 
should be rejected. 
The trial court found that the warranty deed had been executed by all four plaintiffs 
as grantors. The court also found that earnest money agreements which preceded the 
warranty deed and were merged into it and were signed by only some of the parties. (R. 
6877, 6885) In holding that the transactions were separate transactions, the trial court 
concluded: 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust 
Deed prepared at the same time do not constitute a single 
contract. 
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7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this 
case is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of 
the contract, and the Deed become (sic) final and conclusive 
evidence of the contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 
1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese 
Howell Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 
(1916), set forth the controlling law which must be applied in 
the instant case regarding the issue as to whether or not the 
Warranty Deed, Note and Trust Deed constitutes a single 
contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were 
executed at the same time does not make them part of the 
contract to purchase the contract. The Trust Deed and Note are 
documents executed to secure the payment of the property and 
have no bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of 
encumbrances. 
(R. 6890) 
The negotiations over the purchase of Rossi Hills culminated in a warranty deed 
executed by the four plaintiffs in favor of both Doms and McCoy. (Exhibit 1) Mrs. Ellen 
Anderson signed the warranty deed individually because she was a joint tenant of an 
undivided one-half interest. Mrs. Scott signed the deed merely as a courtesy; she had no 
interest in the property. Financing of the balance was accomplished by a trust deed which 
included a new party, the Trustee, and the trust deed note issued by Doms and McCoy which 
benefitted only two of the four grantors, Messrs. Anderson and Scott. Neither Mrs. 
Anderson nor Mrs. Scott benefitted under the trust deed and note. (Exhibits 2 & 3) The 
warranty deed, the trust deed and note could be considered as supplementing each other to 
define all parts of the real estate acquisition. However, contrary to Doms1 claim, the 
warranty deed and the trust deed and trust deed note constitute separate contracts. 
In his claims that the warranty deed, the trust deed, and the trust deed note all 
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constitute a single contract, Doms cites cases and statutes which stand for the proposition 
that the legal debt or obligation secured by a trust deed is part of and inseparable from the 
trust deed. Doms, however, then misconstrues this body of law to mean that the trust deed 
and the warranty deed must be bound together. What Doms ignores is that it is the trust deed 
note which is the legal debt secured by the trust deed. The trust deed note, not the warranty 
deed, is the inseparable companion of the trust deed. If the trust deed and the trust deed note 
are considered one transaction, as the trial court held, the requirements of all of the cases 
cited by Doms on this issue are met and the tortured interpretation set forth by Doms can be 
discarded. The correct interpretation thus leaves the trust deed and trust deed note as one 
contract and the warranty deed as another, separate contract, as the trial court held. 
In Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the criteria that should be used to determine when two or more contemporaneously 
executed instruments should be construed together. The court stated, f,[W]here two or more 
instruments are executed by the same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject matter, they will be read and 
construed together...." 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added). In the present case the criteria 
were not met because the parties executing the warranty deed and the trust deed and note are 
not the same parties and the instruments do not concern the same subject matter. The four-
party warranty deed transferred the real estate to Doms and McCoy. The trust deed and trust 
deed note relate to the financing of a part of the purchase price and were executed by and 
benefitted only two of the parties who executed the warranty deed. 
This case is no different than one where a trust deed and trust deed note were made 
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payable to a bank. The bank's right in the trust deed would not be affected by problems 
involving the warranty deed and neither should the two parties who financed this operation 
be involved with problems relating to the granting of the warranty deed which involved 
additional parties who were not parties to the financing arrangement. The trial court 
correctly ruled that the documents in this case were separate contracts. 
3. Doms was not excused from performance and was in default. 
Doms claims that he was excused from performance under the trust deed and the trust 
deed note. This argument depends on Doms1 incorrect claim that all the documents were one 
contract rather than two as held by the trial court. Doms again fails to perceive the 
difference between an executory and an executed contract. 
One of the contracts in this case is the warranty deed. Plaintiffs thought they were 
issuing a special warranty deed and titled the deed as such. (Exhibit 1) In that case no breach 
of any covenants would have occurred. However, the trial court determined that the deed 
was a general warranty deed. Plaintiffs do not dispute that finding but nevertheless, the 
cause of action in Doms arises by reason of the covenant against encumbrances in the 
warranty deed. A violation of the covenant could give rise to damages unless such action is 
barred by the statute of limitations. However, because the warranty deed was a separate 
contract, breach of that contract would not excuse performance under the separate and 
distinct trust deed/trust deed note. Doms and McCoy failed to pay the note in accordance 
with its terms and this constituted a separate breach. Even if the court determined that Doms 
was excused from payment, Doms also failed to pay the taxes and this constituted yet 
another breach by Doms which is not excused. Failure to pay the taxes was a continuing 
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default under the provisions of the trust deed and resulted in the sale of the property to 
Summit County. Both Doms and McCoy were in continuous, unexcused default for several 
years. 
Doms alleges that failure of consideration is a complete defense and relieves the 
nonbreaching party from performance. But in this case Doms and McCoy received a deed 
which was the full consideration. Further, the trial court found, based on the evidence, that 
Doms knew the properties were subject to certain encumbrances and rights of way before he 
consummated the transaction. (R. 6882-83) The status of the property was known to Doms, 
who got what he paid for, and there is no failure of consideration. 
Doms cites Sprague v. Bovles Brothers Drilling Co.. 294 P.2d 689 (Utah 1956) to 
support his claim that he is excused from performance because of the existence of the 
easement. However, Sprague relates to executory contracts, not executed contracts. This 
is not a case where the four grantors were receiving payment from Doms under a contract 
to convey the property. To the contrary, the grantors had conveyed the property to Doms 
and were not entitled to any further consideration for the transfer of the property. Two of 
the parties had financed a portion of the sales price, but the amounts due under that contract 
are entirely separate from the amounts involved in the purchase contract. 
4. Doms was aware of plaintiffs breach before he purchased the property. 
In Point IVB of his Reply Brief, Doms argues that the statutory covenants contained 
in the warranty deed were breached by plaintiffs upon delivery of the warranty deed. Doms 
Reply Brief at 21. What Doms does not acknowledge is that the trial court found that he 
knew of the encumbrances, which constituted the alleged breach, before he purchased the 
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property. The trial court specifically found that Doms knew that "there were roads and sheds 
on the property." (R. 6883). The court also found that Doms had "actual notice of the 
easement encroachments between October 22, 1981 and November 7, 1981." (R. 6883). 
Finally, the trial court found that Doms "knew or should have known at the time he 
purchased the Rossi Hills Property and the Slipper Parcel that the integrated development 
of the three parcels had failed. . .." (R. 6882). 
These findings by the trial court all illustrate that Doms was aware of any "breach" 
of the covenants contained in the warranty deed before delivery of the warranty deed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this brief and their initial brief, plaintiffs request that that 
portion of the judgment of the trial court which denied Doms' claim of rescission and denied 
Doms' attorney fees be affirmed, but that the portion of the trial court's judgment which 
awarded Doms damages based on his counterclaim be reversed, and that the case be 
remanded to the trial court for dismissal of Doms' counterclaim, and entry of judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs, including an award of all requested attorneys fees. Finally, plaintiffs 
request that those portions of Doms' Reply Brief which present new material be rejected due 
to the procedural irregularities and substantive inadequacy. 
DATED this / / ( l a y of November, 1998. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(—4hft £/«<&< \— 
^ * -"^Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
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ADDENDA NO. 1 
THOSE PEOPLE IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE PROPERTY 
USABLE, OR SOMETHING WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE; BUT THAT IN 
ITS CURRENT STATE, IT WAS MY OPINION, THAT THERE 
WASN'T-- THERE WASN'T ENOUGH LAND AREA TO DO ANYTHING 
WITH IT WITHOUT RESOLVING THE INTERESTS OF THOSE 
NEIGHBORS. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU 
SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED YOUR CLIENT OF YOUR LEGAL OPINION? 
A. I THINK IT WAS IN JANUARY OF 1985. I GOT 
THE MAPS SOMETIME IN LATE DECEMBER OF '84, OR SOMETIME 
IN DECEMBER OF '84, AND I THIlJK IN JANUARY OF '85 I HAD 
A CONVERSATION WITH GENE AND J SAID I THINK THIS THING 
IS REALLY A SERIOUS PROBLEM. 
Q. DID YOU DISCUSS WITH YOUR CLIENT THE 
POSSIBILITY OF LEGAL RESCISSION ON THE ORIGINAL 
WARRANTY DEED AND CONTRACT? 
A. WELL, HE ASKED ME WHAT HIS OPTIONS WERE. I 
THINK I TOLD HIM THAT— HE TOL.D ME HE STILL OWED A LOT 
OF MONEY ON THE PROPERTY. I HAD BEEN APPROACHED ABOUT 
ALMOST A YEAR EARLIER IN MARCH OF '84 BY ED SWEENEY 
REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE THAT THE MONEY WAS OWED TO. 
Q. WHO DID MR. SWEENEY REPRESENT? 
A. MR. SWEENEY CONTACTED ME IN EARLY MARCH OF 
1S84 AND TOLD ME THAT HIS FIRM REPRESENTED THE-- I 
THINK IT WAS THE ESTATE OF DEWEY ANDERSON AT THAT TIME, 
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MR. WALL: FOR THE RECORD, YOUR HONOR, WE 
HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
MR. BIELE: I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT ALL OF 
THOSE EVENTS TOOK PLACE BEFORE--
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. BIELE: -- HE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH YOU. 
THE COURT: WITH YOUR CLIENTS. JUST SO WE 
HAVE THAT FOR THE RECORD. 
MR. BIELE: BY THE WAY, THERE IS NO FIRM 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH. SO THAT'S GONE TOO. 
Q. (BY MR. KELLER) ALL RIGHT. I BELIEVE WE 
WERE AT THE POINT, MR. KINGHORN, WHERE YOU SAID YOU 
CONTACTED MR. SWEENEY IN, I BELIEVE YOU SAID, JANUARY 
OF '85; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND DID YOU HAVE A MEETING WITH THEM OR DID 
YOU JUST TALK WITH HIM BY TELEPHONE? 
A. I THINK I TALKED WITH HIM ON THE TELEPHONE 
FIRST AND THEN WE HAD A MEETING A COUPLE OF DAYS AFTER. 
Q. WHAT DID YOU TELL MR. SWEENEY? 
A. INITIALLY I ASKED HIM IF HE REMEMBERED THE 
PROBLEM WE HAD TALKED ABOUT IN MARCH '84. HE AND I HAD 
BEEN IN CONTACT DURING 1984 BECAUSE WE WERE PARTIES IN 
LITIGATION ON SOME OTHER PARK CITY STUFF AND SO WE SAW 
EACH OTHER VERY FREQUENTLY. AND I ASKED HIM IF HE 
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RECALLED THIS THING, AND THE KIND OF ISSUES THAT I WAS 
CONCERNED ABOUT; TOLD HIM THAT I FINALLY HAD A SURVEY 
THAT REALLY LAID IT OUT FOR US AND I WANTED TO MEET 
WITH HIM AND PRESENT A PROPOSAL AND TALK WITH HIM ABOUT 
IT. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND DID YOU SUBSEQUENTLY HAVE 
THAT MEETING? 
A. YES, I DID. 
Q. AND DO YOU KNOW WHEN THAT TOOK PLACE? 
A. MIDDLE OF JANUARY, 1985, I WENT THROUGH AND 
RESEARCHED TIME RECORDS AND SO FORTH TO PUT MY 
AFFIDAVITS TOGETHER, AND IT'S MORE SPECIFIC IN THERE IF 
YOU WANT ME TO REFER TO THAT. 
Q. WOULD YOU REFER TO PARAGRAPH 16 IN YOUR 
AFFIDAVIT, BECAUSE I WILL ASK YOU SEVERAL QUESTIONS 
ABOUT-- THAT MAY REFRESH YOUR MEMORY ABOUT IT. 
APPROXIMATELY MID JANUARY OF 1985 YOU MET 
WITH MR. SWEENEY. WHERE DID YOU MEET WITH HIM? 
A. I THINK IT WAS IN MY OFFICE. 
Q. NOW, AGAIN, AT THE TIME YOU MET WITH HIM, 
HE TOLD YOU HE WAS REPRESENTING WHOM? 
MR. BIELE: HE WAS REPRESENTING THE ANDERSON 
ESTATE. 
MR. KELLER: ANDERSON ESTATE? 
MR. BIELE: YES. 
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PROPERTY AND THAT ROAD FOR A PERIOD LONG IN EXCESS OF 
20 YEARS, TOLD THEM I HAD NOT SPOKEN TO THE SORENSONS, 
NOT SPOKEN TO ANY OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS THAT I 
BELIEVED HAD ANY VESTED INTEREST BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT 
TO CREATE IMPRESSIONS IN THEIR MINDS THAT THEY HAD 
LEGAL RIGHTS THAT THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE. 
I WAS NOT AWARE OF WHETHER OR NOT ANY OF 
THOSE PARTIES MIGHT HAVE HAD PERMISSION, WHICH WAS THE 
ONLY ELEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS THAT I WAS 
REALLY AMBIGUOUS ABOUT. 
I TOLD THEM THAT I FELT UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DOMS AND MCCOY WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
THE TRANSACTION RESCINDED, WE WERE ENTITLED TO GET ALL 
OF OUR MONEY BACK, THERE WAS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE 
WARRANTY AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES IF THESE THINGS WERE 
ENFORCEABLE PROPERTY INTERESTS, PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS, 
AND WHILE I MIGHT WORK AROUND THE PROBLEMS BY PROVIDING 
SUBSTITUTE ACCESS TO THESE PEOPLE IN SOME WAY, THE 
PROBLEM OF THEIR BACK YARDS AND THEIR SHEDS AND SOME OF 
THESE OTHER THINGS, ACTUALLY TAKING AWAY USABLE 
PROPERTIES FROM THEIR HOMES WAS A TOUGHER PROBLEM, IN 
MY EXPERIENCE IN PARK CITY, THAN JUST SIMPLY TRYING TO 
ESTABLISH SUBSTITUTE ACCESS WITH A ROAD, AND THAT IT 
LOOKED LIKE IT COULD BE A, BIG CONTINUOUS PROBLEM. AND 
I MADE THE PROPOSAL THAT MR. DOMS AUTHORIZED ME TO MAKE 
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IN LIEU OF SEEKING RESCISSION, THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING 
TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPROMISE, AND IF THEY WOULD BE 
WILLING TO CANCEL THE BALANCE ON THE NOTE WE WERE 
WILLING TO DEED THE PROPERTY BACK. 
Q. WHAT RESPONSE DID YOU RECEIVE AT THAT TIME? 
A. AT THAT TIME I WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS 
A PAYMENT COMING UP AND I DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE THEM 
THINK WE WERE IGNORING THE SITUATION, BUT I WAS-- BUT I 
FELT I WAS ENTITLED TO ADVISE MY CLIENT WE DIDN'T HAVE 
TO MAKE THE PAYMENT. 
ED TOLD ME THAT-- WE WENT THERE AND WE TALKED 
ABOUT IT. I DIDN'T MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS ABOUT WHAT I 
THOUGHT ABOUT IT, A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OR ANYTHING 
OF THAT KIND. HE DID TELL ME THAT HE WOULD GET BACK TO 
ME ABOUT IT. 
Q. NOW THE PAYMENT, MR. KINGHORN-- I'M SORRY. 
A. I BELIEVE AT THAT TIME HE TOLD ME THAT HE 
WOULD GET BACK TO ME ON WHETHER OR NOT WE WOULD HAVE TO 
MAKE THE PAYMENT BECAUSE, I THINK-- IF I REMEMBER 
CORRECTLY, I THINK HE SAID, "JUST DON'T DO ANYTHING 
MORE UNTIL I GET BACK TO YOU." 
Q. WAS THE PAYMENT YOU'RE REFERRING TO, WAS 
THE $194,000 PAYMENT, THE PRINCIPAL PAYMENT, DUE 
JANUARY 25TH, 1985? IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. I BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT. 
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AND ONE ASKING A QUESTION AND I MAKE A NOTE OF THAT AND 
THE OTHER ASKING THE SAME QUESTION. JUST BECAUSE IT'S 
COMPOUNDED AND REPETITIVE DOESN'T MAKE ANY DEEPER 
IMPRESSION UPON ME. SO GO AHEAD. 
MR. KELLER: I UNDERSTAND, YOUR HONOR. THANK 
YOU. 
EUGENE E. POMS 
RECALLED AS A WITNESS IN BEHALF OF THE 
DEFENDANT, HAVING FIRST BEEN DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED FURTHER UPON OATH AS FOLLOWS: 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. KELLER: 
Q. MR. DOMS, WHEN DID YOU FIRST BECOME AWARE 
THAT THE LOOP ROAD AND FENCES, ETCETERA, WERE 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS THAT PRECLUDED YOUR IDEA OF 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANDERSON PARCEL? 
A. IN LATE 1984, AFTER THE ALLIANCE SURVEY WAS 
COMPLETED AND HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO JERRY KINGHORN. 
JERRY KINGHORN HAD REVIEWED IT AND COMPLETED HIS 
RESEARCH AND INFORMED ME IN HIS LEGAL OPINION THAT 
THERE WERE PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS ON THE PROPERTY. 
Q. AND YOU ORIGINALLY PURCHASED THE PROPERTY 
BY WARRANTY DEED DATED MARCH 10TH, 1982, WE HAVE 
ESTABLISHED, AND MR. KINGHORN HAS TESTIFIED THAT HE 
FIRST BECAME INVOLVED, APPROXIMATELY, WITH THIS PARCEL 
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INCLUDE WHAT? 
A. FORMING A LEGAL OPINION BASED ON THE 
DEFINITIVE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FINALLY HAD. 
Q. AND DID HE REPORT BACK TO YOU WITH REGARD 
TO HIS LEGAL OPINION THAT THESE WERE PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENTS THAT WOULD PRECLUDE YOUR DEVELOPMENT PLAN? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHEN DID YOU DO THAT, APPROXIMATELY? 
A. DECEMBER OF '84 OR JANUARY '85. 
Q. AND ONCE HE REPORTED THAT BACK TO YOU, WHAT 
INSTRUCTIONS DID YOU GIVE HIM? 
A. TO CONTACT THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, OR 
THE PREVIOUS OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, AND BEGIN TO 
DISCUSS THE PROBLEM, SEE IF HE COULD WORK A SOLUTION 
OUT. 
Q. AND AMONG THE SOLUTIONS YOU WOULD PROPOSE 
TO THE OTHER SIDE WAS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT, GIVE THE 








FROM THE TRUST DEED NOTE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
YES, SIR. 
THAT PROPOSAL WAS MADE THE FIRST TIME IN 
'85; THAT IS CORRECT? 
I BELIEVE THAT'S RIGHT, YES. 
MR. DOMS, WHY DIDN'T YOU OFFER TO THE 
IN THIS CASE TO RESCIND THIS PROPERTY PRIOR 
O f,'-) r» O IT 535 
